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WHITE-COLLAR CRIME, WHITE-COLLAR TIME:
THE SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR OFFENDERS
IN THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
John L. Hagan* & Ilene H. Nagel**
In this Article, Professors Hagan and Nagel report upon their study of
sentencing patterns in white-collar cases tried in the Southern District of
New York between 1963 and 1976. Using multiple regression analysis,
the authors first demonstrate a strong correlation between lenient sen-
tencing practices and white-collar offenses. The authors then focus their
study upon various white-collar crimes, using multiple regression
analysis to reveal that considerable variation exists between sentencing
patterns for the different white-collar offenses and for the different types
of defendants sentenced in the Southern District during the period under
study.
The sentencing of white-collar offenders is of increasing concern to students of
jurisprudence.' The issue seems deceptively simple: do white-collar offenders
receive treatment at the sentencing stage equal to that received by other kinds of
criminal offenders?2 A number of factors, however, make this question difficult to
answer. First, although the term "white-collar crime" is popular in current thought
and discourse, there is much disagreement and confusion regarding its meaning.'
*Professor of Sociology and Law, University of Toronto, Ph.D. 1974, University of Alberta.
**Associate Professor of Law and Sociology, Indiana University (Bloomington) School of Law, M.A.
1973; Ph.D. 1974, New York University. Funds for this research were provided by a grant to the authors
from the National Institute of Mental Health, Crime and Delinquency Section. The authors wish to ex-
press gratitude to Sheldon Plager for his comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. For a classic statement of issues in this area, see Sutherland, White-Collar Criminality, in
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 38, 45-46 (G. Geis & R. Meier eds., rev. ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as
White-Collar Criminality]. According to Sutherland, disparities in the sentencing of white-collar and
common criminals which benefit white-collar offenders reflect differences among the offenders rather
than differences among the types of offenses committed. See also Nagel & Hagan, The Sentencing of
White-Collar Criminals in Federal Courts: A Socio-Legal Exploration of Disparity, 80 MICH. L. REV.
1427-28 (1982) (sentence disparities favoring white-collar criminals may be encouraged by a significantly
increased emphasis on the prosecution of white-collar crimes); Mann, Wheeler & Sarat, Sentencing the
White-Collar Offender, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 479, 500 (1980) (difficulties in defining, providing
evidence, and observing disparities in sentencing).
2. The issue this article addresses is part of a larger literature concerned with the manner in which
various offender attributes influence sentencing, including race, sex, and age, as well as class position.
See, e.g., Nagel & Hagan, Gender and Crime: Offense Patterns and Criminal Court Sanctions, in CRIME
AND JUSTICE: ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH (N. Morris & M. Tonry eds. 1982); Kleck, Racial
Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing: A Critical Evaluation of the Evidence with Additional Evidence
on the Death Penalty, 46 AM. Soc. REV. 783 (1981); Hagan, Extra-Legal Attributes and Criminal
Sentencing: An Assessment of a Sociological Viewpoint, 8 LAW & Soc'y REV. 357 (1974). However, ex-
cept for considering the level of education of the offender, see, e.g., infra text accompanying note 24, the
present concern focuses on the type of crime rather than on the attributes of the offender.
3. See E. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 9 (1949) (crime committed by a person of respectability
and high social status in the course of his occupation); Edelhertz, The Nature, Impact and Prosecution of
White-Collar Crime, in WHITE COLLAR CRIMES: DEFENNE AND) PROSECUTION 16 (B. George, Jr. ed. 1971)
("an illegal act or series of illegal acts committed by nonphysical means and by concealment or guile, to
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Second, equal sentencing treatment has proved difficult to measure, in part because
the notion of "equality before the law" has several meanings,4 and in part because
the statistical techniques required to measure disparities in treatment among cases
are uncertain.' Third, the particular context in which the issue of white-collar
obtain money or property, to avoid the payment or loss of money or property, or to obtain business or
personal advantage"); Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 409
(1980) (nonviolent crimes typically committed by "well-to-do" individuals or associations).
4. See Hagan, Race, Class and the Perception of Criminal Injustice in America, 87 AM. J. OF Soc.
(1982); Nettler, Criminal Justice, in 5 ANNUAL REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY 27, 30 (A. Inkeles ed. 1979). Nettler
identifies three common meanings of equality (numerical, proportional and subjective equality), all of
which find form in discussions of criminal sentencing. It is the subjective meaning given to equality in
sentencing, however, that ultimately is the most troublesome. The arguments of Pelaez exemplify the
problem:
Much is made of the fact that punishments must be equal-that it is somehow unfair to
sentence one person who commits a crime to a term of imprisonment and another to an
alternative non-imprisonment sanction. However, punishment can never be equal. To
some, a year in jail is no big deal. To others, it is a horrendous punishment that may drive
the recipient to or over the suicidal brink. To say that sentencing each of those very dif-
ferent felons to one year in prison is to punish them equally ignores reality. Equal sentences
have nothing to do with equal punishment and everything to do with providing only the
outward appearance of equal punishment. Punishment is a subjective thing, and the extent
of the punishment differs with regard to the sensitivity to a particular punishment of the
person we seek to punish.
Pelaez, Of Crime and Punishment: Sentencing the White-Collar Criminal, 18 DUQ. L. REV. 823, 842
(1980); see also infra notes 44-51 and accompanying text (describing equality in sentencing); Mann,
Wheeler & Sarat, supra note 1, at 499 (judges often influenced by several factors to find non-incar-
cerative disposition). But cf. Geis, Criminal Penaltiesfor Corporate Criminals, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 377, 378
(1972) (failure of judges to inflict heavy penalties, particularly prison sentences, on corporate criminals
often represents class prejudice so evident that it leads citizens to question the fairness and integrity of
justice system).
5. A standard methodology used to measure disparity in sentencing is based on the statistical tech-
niques of multiple regression analysis. See, e.g., Nagel & Hagan, supra note 1 at 1450. For examples of
the use of multiple regression analysis in legal commentary, see Finkelstein, The Judicial Reception of
Multiple Regression Studies in Race and Sex Discrimination Cases, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 702 (1980). See
also Finkelstein, A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF GUILTY PLEA PRACTICES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS; Sym-
posium, Statistical Evidence in the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 164 (1975). The
use of this approach ideally requires a dependent variable, in this case the sentence imposed, that is
measured on an interval scale in which the units are equally spaced. Consequently, sentences have been
treated in a variety of ways which are problematical in that they do not reveal the variety of sanctions
characteristically used in white-collar cases to reach compromises between the kinds of sentencing goals
outlined below.
For example, one approach to the analysis of sentence disparity has involved considering only those
offenders sentenced to time in prison, using the length of incarceration as the dependent measure. See,
e.g., Chiricos and Waldo, Socio-Economic Status and Criminal Sentencing: An Empirical Assessment of
a Conflict Proposition, 40 AM. Soc. REV. 753 (1975). This of course ignores those offenders, many of
whom may be white-collar, not sentenced to prison. Another approach is to assign a value of zero on a
length of imprisonment scale to all offenders who received a sentence other than imprisonment. See, e.g.,
Lizotte, Extra-Legal factors in Chicago's Criminal Courts: Testing the Conflict Model of Criminal
Justice 25 Soc. PROBS. 564 (1978). A difficulty with this approach is that it is not clear that a zero value
appropriately captures the meaning of a noncustodial sentence. For example, is there an equivalence be-
tween varying terms of probation and zero months imprisonment? Moreover, is it proper to assume that
all non-custodial sentences, e.g., fines or probation, are equal? A third approach places a variety of dif-
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sentencing disparity is posed, i.e., the time, place and particular kind of white-collar
crime considered, may limit substantially the validity of conclusions reached in any
single study.6 Nonetheless, empirical studies utilizing social scientific techniques are
providing new data which may sharpen the focus of the disparity debate and raise
new questions about sentencing offenders for their white-collar crimes. 7
Part I of this article addresses methodological problems of white-collar crime
research, continuing and elaborating upon previous studies conducted by the
authors.' Part II analyzes sentencing data collected over a fourteen-year period in
one of America's largest and best known federal district courts, the Southern
District of New York, 9 in which there is a relatively high incidence of white-collar
crime prosecution.' This analysis differs considerably from the authors' previous
studies as it focuses on only one federal district court instead of several'' and con-
siders more cases over a much longer period of time.' 2 Moreover, the greater case
base permits separate examination of varied white-collar offenses and the cor-
responding sentencing responses to each, allowing a determination of which
white-collar offenses are distinguished by patterns of preferential sentencing. 3
ferent kinds of sentences on a single scale by assigning integer values to different versions of these sanc-
tions. See, e.g., Tiffany, Avichai and Peters, A Statistical Analysis of Sentencing in Federal Courts:
Defendants Convicted After Trial, 1967-68, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 369 (1975); Diamond and Zeisel, Sentenc-
ing Councils: A Study of Sentence Disparity and its Reduction, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 109 (1975-76).
6. See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text (describing significance of context).
7. See, e.g., Nagel & Hagan, supra note 1; S. Wheeler, D. Weisburd & N. Bode, Sentencing the
White-Collar Offender: Rhetoric and Reality, 47 AM. Soc. REV. 641 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Rhetoric
and Reality]; Hagan, Nagel & Albonetti, The Differential Sentencing of White-Collar Offenders in Ten
Federal District Courts, 45 AM. Soc. REV. 802 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Differential Sentencing in
Federal Courts]; Mann, Wheeler & Sarat, supra note 1.
8. See Nagel & Hagan, supra note 1; Hagan, Nagel & Albonetti, The Social Organization of
White-Collar Sanctions: A Study of Prosecution and Punishment in the Federal Courts, in
WHITE-COLLAR AND ECONOMIC CRIME 259 (P. Wickman & T. Dailey eds. 1982) [hereinafter cited Pros-
ecution and Punishment]; Differential Sentencing in Federal Courts, supra note 7.
9. See infra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing the particular statistical context of the study
undertaken for this article).
10. The significance of particular prosecutorial orientations on sentencing was analyzed in Nagel &
Hagan, supra note 1, at 1448, 1454-55. The data suggested that a significantly increased societal emphasis
on the prosecution of white-collar crimes combined with an active prosecutorial policy, may encourage
sentence leniency for white-collar offenders in exchange for a high rate of conviction. The resulting
disparity favors those convicted of white-collar over common crime. These disparities between the severi-
ty of sentences for white-collar versus non-white-collar offenders may, for example, be an exchange of
sentence leniency for testimony and evidence needed for white-collar convictions. See Nagel & Hagan,
supra note 1, at 1454-55; Differential Sentencing in Federal Courts, supra note 7, at 818-19.
II. See Nagel & Hagan, supra note I (cases in ten federal district courts considered).
12. See infra text accompanying note 57 (detailing number of cases and time period under study).
13. See infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text (listing the several white-collar crimes covered in the
study). Presented in two parts, this Article first analyzes the first two of the multiple regression ap-
proaches discussed in note 5 supra. In Part II, the Article examines more basic cross-tabulations of of-
fense categories and sanctions. The latter approach reveals in more detail the types of patterns that
characterize the sentencing of white-collar as compared with other kinds of offenders. This Article
hypothesizes that it is only when one looks at different kinds of white-collar crimes and the specific com-
binations of sanctions received by offenders that the distinctiveness of white-collar sanctioning and the
disparities between white-collar cases begins to become apparent. See infra notes 90-127 and accompany-
ing text (analyzing sentencing disparities between specific white-collar offenses).
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I. METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME RESEARCH
A. DEFINITIONAL ISSUES
Although Edwin Sutherland first attempted a definition of white-collar crime in
1939, '4 the question of just what constitutes white-collar crime remains open. 5 A
1980 annotated bibliography on white-collar crime published by the United States
Department of Justice concluded that "[tihere is no universally accepted definition
of white-collar crime."'1 6 Although much literature is beginning to shed some light
on this definitional issue,' 7 a consensus has yet to emerge.'I Empirical studies which
employ alternative operational definitions to address issues of sentencing disparity
are thus likely a priori to produce variable results, leaving the question of disparity
unresolved.' 9
The disparate definitions of white-collar crime reflect disagreement over the
kinds of crimes and persons to be included. Katz notes that "[t]here are relatively
few crimes that can be committed only by those in white-collar occupations. '2
Similarly Geis observes that "[wihite-collar crimes can be committed by persons in
all social classes."2' Going even further, Nagel and Hagan assert that most
white-collar offenses are committed by non-white-collar persons.2 2
14. SUTHERLAND, supra note 3, at 9. According to Sutherland, white-collar crimes in businesses and
the professions consist principally of the violation of a delegated or implied trust, generally consisting of
(I) misrepresentation of asset values and (2) duplicity in the manipulation of power. White-Collar
Criminality, supra note 1, at 40.
15. See generally sources cited supra at note 3.
16. White-Collar Crime: The Problem and the Federal Response, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978).
17. See, e.g., A. REISS, JR. & A. BIDERMAN, DATA SOURCES ON WHITE-COLLAR LAW-BREAKING 4
(Sept. 1980) (published by National Institute of Justice) (white-collar violations involve use of violator's
position of significant power, influence, or trust in legitimate economic or political institutional order for
purpose of illegal gain, or to commit illegal act for personal or organizational gain); A. BEQUAI,
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A 20TH-CENTURY CRISIS 3 (1978) (white-collar crimes costlier than common
crimes; white-collar criminals rely on deceit and concealment instead of force and physical violence,
although both types of crime have same monetary or property objective); Shapiro, A Background Paper
on White Collar Crime, Considerations of Conceptualization and Future Research (Feb. 1976) (un-
published thesis, Department of Sociology, Yale University); see also sources cited supra note 3.
18. See White Collar Crime: The Problem and the Federal Response: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. VI (1978).
Basically the definitions fall into three groups, according to where the most emphasis is
placed: (1) on the characteristics of the offender; (2) on the characteristics of the crime
itself; or (3) on the means employed to commit the illegal act. Despite their differences, all
the proposed definitions suggest that a white-collar crime is an illegal act which is commit-
ted in the context of a lawful occupation, involves a breach of trust, does not rely on
physical force, and has money, property, or power as the primary goal.
Id.
19. See supra note 5 (discussing several methodological approaches which employ alternative opera-
tional definitions in the study of sentencing).
20. Katz, Legality and Equality: Plea Bargaining in the Prosecution of White-Collar and Common
Crimes, 13 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 431, 433 (1979).
21. Geis, Avocational Crime, in HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY 273, 284 (D. Glaser ed. 1974).
22. Nagel & Hagan, supra note 1, at 1457.
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Because of these differences of perspective, the first challenge of any qualitative
study is to arrive at a homogeneous grouping of offenses involving white-collar per-
sons. Operationally, this has been done in two ways. Wheeler, Weisburd, and Bode
sample only those cases thought most likely on the basis of offense content to be
white-collar;23 Hagan, Nagel, and Albonetti divide cases into those regarded by
Assistant United States Attorneys as common crimes and those regarded as
white-collar crimes and then cross-classify this division by separating the defen-
dants into those who have and have not received college educations.2 4 The latter ap-
proach, which is applied in this Article, yields four offender/offense categories: col-
lege-educated persons convicted of white-collar crimes, non-college-educated per-
sons convicted of white-collar crimes, college-educated persons convicted of com-
mon crimes, and non-college-educated persons convicted of common crimes.
The four categories were cross-tabulated with federal crimes which Hagan,
Nagel, and Albonetti25 and Wheeler, Weisburd, and Bode26 all define as
white-collar offenses: restraint of trade, 27  bribery involving United States
officials, 28 false claims to a United States Agency, 29 fraud or false statements to
government agencies,3 0 bank embezzlements, 3 false entries on bank records, 32 false
statements on loan applications,33 mail fraud,3 4 tax evasion,35 failure to file,3 6 and
Internal Revenue Service fraud.37 Also included within the data for this article were
two types of securities exchange violations considered only by Wheeler, Weisburd,
and Bode38 and the embezzlement of public funds.3 9
Questions still remain as to whether the sentences meted out to white-collar per-
sons are uniform, and, conversely, whether within this white-collar group, sentenc-
ing varies according to the nature and type of white-collar crime at issue. Despite the
common assumption that white-collar offenders uniformly receive lenient
sentences, no obvious grounds exist for believing that all white-collar offenders are
treated alike.40 That is, there may be intra- as well as inter- class variation in sen-
23. See Rhetoric and Reality, supra note 7.
24. Differential Sentencing in Federal Courts, supra note 7, at 803, 806-07. The same approach is used
in Nagel & Hagan, supra note 1. Income is used rather than education with similar results in Prosecution
and Punishment, supra note 8 at 259.
25. See Differential Sentencing in Federal Courts note 7.
26. See Rhetoric and Reality, supra note 7.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1976).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1976).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 656 (1976).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 1005 (1976).
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1976).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
35. I.R.C. § 7201 (1976).
36. I.R.C. § 7203 (1976).
37. I.R.C. § 7206-1 (1976).
38. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77, 78 (1976). See Rhetoric and Reality, supra note 7.
39. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1976).
40. See, e.g., Browder v. United States, 398 F. Supp. 1042, 1046 (D. Or. 1975) (defendant sentenced to
25 years for transporting stolen securities in interstate commerce; study conducted by defendant revealed
that the most lenient sentences levied in the white-collar crime area were given to persons convicted of
crimes similar to defendant's), aff'd, 544 F.2d 525 (1976); United States v. Greenberg, 332 F. Supp. 1324,
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tencing. For example, the authors' earlier research revealed that judges frequently
indicated their tendency to hold public officials to a higher standard of justice than
those outside public service. 4' The article examines whether this kind of distinction
is reflected in the sentencing of public, as compared to private-sector, embezzlers,
and whether recognizable distinctions are drawn between other kinds of white-collar
offenders as well. 42 To facilitate the analysis in Part II, white-collar crime is defined
as including those crimes listed above.43
B. EQUALITY IN SENTENCING
"Equality before the law" is perhaps nowhere more amorphous than in its ap-
plication to the sentencing of white-collar offenders. 44 This is reflected in at least
two kinds of comments made by judges about the sentences they impose in
white-collar cases. First, judges suggest that white-collar offenders experience sanc-
tions differently from other kinds of offenders,45 and second, they assert that dif-
ferent kinds of sanctions may be appropriate in white-collar cases. 46 Often the im-
plication is that equity and broad social utility will only be achieved when different
kinds of sanctions are applied.4 7
1328 (D.Minn. 1971) ($10,000 fine, five years probation and 90 days imprisonment held to be reasonable
sentence for failure to file interest equalization tax forms); United States v. National Dairy Products
Corp., 1964 TRADE CAS. (CCH): 71,163, at 79,608 (three month sentence on each count of criminal anti-
trust conviction; sentence suspended).
41. See infra note 95 (discussing the cases of former Governors Otto Kerner (Ill.), Marvin Mandel
(Md.), and Ray Blanton (Tenn.)).
42. See infra notes 108-17 and accompanying text (discussing violations of embezzlement and bribery
statutes by public and private figures).
43. See supra notes 27-39 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Nagel & Hagan, supra note 1 at 1430 n.ll.
45. After interviewing a sample of Federal District Court judges, Mann, Wheeler, and Sarat conclud-
ed: "Most judges share a widespread belief that the suffering experienced by a white-collar person as a
result of apprehension, public indictment and conviction, and the collateral disabilities incident to convic-
tion-loss of job, professional licenses, and status in the community-completely satisfies the need to
punish the individual." Mann, Wheeler & Sarat, supra note 1, at 483-84. See also Nagel & Hagan, supra
note I at 1455 n.90.
46. The eminent Judge Marvin Frankel, in United States v. Paterno, 375 F. Supp. 647 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), offered an example of this argument:
The defendants.. .have led exemplary lives... .They have built stable families and a stable
business. People of distinction and more humble workers in their enterprise write letters of
sincere praise, devotion, and appreciation on their behalf. The defendants have not been
ungenerous in dealing with friends, employees, family members and charitable agencies. It
may be predicted with reasonable confidence that neither defendant will ever run afoul of
the law again. The fall from untarnished eminence in their communities has been an ir-
reparably grievous blow. The defendants, in the frequently heard but still pertinent appeal,
'have been punished enough already.' It is urged earnestly that a sentence of imprisonment
would serve ends only of vengeance.
Id. at 648; see United States v. Braun, 382 F. Supp. 214, 214-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (improper to imprison
"excessively ambitious" tax evader in light of pardon of President Nixon); United States v. Haggett, 360
F. Supp. 502, 506-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (judge must examine characteristics of defendant and cir-
cumstances of his case when imposing sentence). Cf. United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496, 500-01
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (community service ruled insufficient sentence for fraud conviction).
47. The argument for white-collar leniency is as follows: the defendant, having suffered as a conse-
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What kinds of sentences, then, are appropriate for white-collar offenders? In
most cases, judges seem to face a recurring problem: how to accomplish the goal of
general deterrence while still treating the individual offender justly.4 8 The aim is to
impose a sentence that will have some deterrent effect, without imposing the
deprivations that would result from an extended stay in prison.4 9 To this end, judges
have attempted to use fines and innovative sentencing schemes to punish
white-collar offenders 0 and, in so doing, have sparked considerable controversy
among legal scholars.5' The major purpose of this Article is to examine the disparity
and severity of these sentences in the Southern District of New York.
quence of prosecution and conviction, does not require a severe sentence. Indeed, such a sentence would
constitute inequality before the law. The combination of a stiff sentence and the ordeal of prosecution
could constitute a greater punishment than is ordinarily given a defendant from a less eminent
background.
48. A judge interviewed by Mann, Wheeler, and Sarat suggests the conflict this dilemma has
stimulated:
The problem is the tension between use of incarceration for its deterrent factor, and the in-
clination not to use it because it is too excessive given the non-criminal record of the of-
fender. From the individual standpoint there are good arguments against sentencing; from
the societal interest in deterring crime there are some good arguments for using the
sentence. And that tension is more pronounced with the white-collar criminal
[because]...the deterrent effect I think is at its highest, the personal situation rather
favorable, and so the tension between those two values is very acute.
Mann, Wheeler & Sarat, supra note 1, at 499. These authors conclude that most judges seek a com-
promise in resolving this dilemma: "[tihe weekend sentence, the very short jail term, and the relatively fre-
quent use of amended sentences (where a judge imposes a prison term and later reduces it) are evidence of
this search for a compromise." Id. at 499. Cf. United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. at 498-502 (discus-
sion of weaknesses of novel sentencing); United States v. Braun, 382 F. Supp. at 215-16 (illustration of
inequity inherent in lenient white-collar sentencing).
49. See Mann, Wheeler & Sarat, supra note 1, at 483-84.
50. Mann, Wheeler, and Sarat, however, seem to find the federal judges they interviewed more in
favor of incarceration than monetary penalties, at least in the abstract, as serving the deterrent function
most effectively. They report:
[A] conspicuous absence of responses by judges [was] that a fine was the appropriate sanc-
tion to be imposed on a defendant.... In several cases we were told that fines were imposed
but little import was attributed to their impact. Where fines were used in conjunction with
another sentence it was generally the other sentence... that was thought to have the intended
deterrent effect. Where the fine was used alone, the idea that the commencement of the
criminal process against the defendant was the punishment seemed to be more important in
the judges' minds than the fine itself.
Mann, Wheeler & Sarat, supra note 1, at 496. See generally Renfrew, The Paper Label Sentences: An
Evaluation, 86 YALE L.J. 590 (1977) (public oral presentation confessing wrondoing imposed as condition
of probation for corporate executive convicted of price-fixing); Liman, The Paper Label Sentences:
Critiques, 86 YALE L.J. 630 (1977) (arguing against innovative punishment in criminal antitrust setting,
commentator favors imprisonment). For example, see the differing views expressed on this subject by
Professors Posner and Coffee, infra note 51.
51. Professor Posner asserts that "the white-collar criminal ... should be punished only by monetary
penalties-by fines (where civil damages or penalties are inadequate or inappropriate) rather than by im-
prisonment or other 'afflictive' punishments (save as they may be necessary to coerce payment of the
monetary penalty)." Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 AM. GRIM. L. REV. 409,
410 (1980). Although he acknowledges that a system in which poor offenders are usually imprisoned yet
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C. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CONTEXT
White-collar criminality is particularly susceptible to variation in treatment ac-
cording to the context considered. Recent work suggests wide historical variation in
the intensity of prosecution of white-collar crime.5 2 In addition, changes in public
opinion, political philosophy, and the priorities of judges and jurisdictions in which
prosecutions take place are likely to influence sentencing outcomes. The significant
shifts that seem to have recently occurred in public and private attitudes toward
white-collar crime underline this point: where the Carter Administration made the
prosecution of white-collar crime a national priority,53 the Reagan administration
seems much less inclined to do so. 54 The findings reported in this study are therefore
time and place specific.
Nevertheless, the data in this Article represent a particularly significant context.
The data cover a lengthy period, 1963 to 1976, in what is frequently regarded as one
of the most important federal district courts in the country.55 The purpose of the
analyses presented in this Article is to supplement and improve the inadequate
knowledge presently available about sentencing disparities in this significant
American jurisdiction.5 6
rich offenders are usually fined might be perceived as one which discriminates against the poor, id. at 415,
he argues, however, that if the fines were suitably large, this would not occur. Professor Posner views
large fines as deterring crime with equal effectiveness as imprisonment, and cheaper to administer. Id. at
410. See also Mann, Wheeler & Sarat, supra note I (punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation goals of
sentencing sufficiently served by fines).
Professor Coffee disagrees and he argues that the economic models proposed for the calculation of ap-
propriate fines are flawed and unrealistic. Coffee, Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago
View of the Economics of Criminal Sanctions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 419, 421, 427-28 (1980). Coffee
concludes that "[a] system that fines the rich and jails the poor risks the appearance of institutionalizing
bias, and its asserted efficiency may depend upon some myopic social cost accounting." Id. at 469.
52. See e.g., Project, White-Collar Crime: Second Annual Survey of Law, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 266
n.757 (1981); compare Richard, Symposium on White-Collar Crime: Introduction, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 975
(1980) (burgeoning public indignation and outrage during late 1970's led to channeling of prosecutorial
resources toward white-collar crime) with Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions
in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHi. L. REV. 423, 437 (1963) (lack of enforcement of criminal
sanctions against white-collar criminals related to absence of sustained public moral resentment) and
Sutherland, White-Collar Criminality, supra note I (white-collar criminals not considered real criminals
by themselves, public, or criminologists).
53. See generally Abrams, Assessing the Federal Government's "War" on White-Collar Crime, 53
TEMP. L.Q. 984 (1980) (examining various aspects of Carter administration's white-collar crime enforce-
ment efforts).
54. Taylor, Reagan Team Plans to Slash Efforts to Catch White-Collar Criminals, Wall St. J., Sept.
28, 1981 at 29, col.3. See also Nagel & Hagan, supra note 1 at 1442 and nn.56-57.
55. This court for the Southern District of New York is located close to Wall Street on the southern tip
of Manhattan, and is "the 'premiere' prosecution office in the country." Katz, The Social Movement
Against White-Collar Crime, 2CRIMINOLOGY REV. Y.B. 174 (E. Bittner and S. Messinger eds. 1980). This
District's distinguished bench and competent prosecutorial resources underlie the District's reputation as
one of the most active in the country in its pursuit of white-collar crime. See, e.g., Mann, Wheeler &
Sarat, supra note 1 at 481 n.7 (other districts cited).
56. See Seymour, Social and Ethical Considerations In Assessing White-Collar Crime, II AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 821, 826-34 (comparing sentences imposed for white-collar crimes between Southern District of
New York and all other federal district courts).
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II. THE SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS
IN THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
The quantitative case data analyzed in this Article consist of all 18,289 cases in-
volving defendants convicted from 1963 to 1976 in the Southern District of New
York.5" The data were collected by the Probation Department of the Southern
District in order to make information available to sentencing judges.58 To supple-
ment these data, interviews were conducted with presiding judges, the United States
Attorney and Assistant United States Attorneys, probation officers, the Chief Ad-
ministrator of the Pretrial service agency, magistrates, and the chief of the public
defender office.
White-collar crimes were separated from common crimes according to the statute
violated. This division was then cross-classified with two categories: offenders who
have received a college education and those who have not. The four resulting of-
fender-offense combinations are indicated in Table 1 for each of the fourteen years
from 1963 to 1976. The most striking pattern revealed by this Table is the rather
substantial decline in the annual percentage of cases involving non-college-educated
persons convicted of common crimes59 and a parallel increase in the proportion of
cases involving white-collar crimes committed by both college-educated and non-
college-educated offenders. 60 Similarly, the annual proportion of college-educated
persons convicted of common crimes steadily increased from 1963 to 1976.
The emphasis that the Southern District of New York placed on the prosecution
of white-collar crime during this period is reflective of a proactive prosecutorial
policy, i.e., a policy which involves the positive assignment of resources to these
types of prosecutions and an activist approach to their initiation and successful com-
pletion. 6' Because the victims of white-collar crime usually do not immediately
57. The authors obtained these data in 1978 from the Chief of Probation for the Southern District of
New York.
58. Id. The case data collected by the Probation Department were adapted into machine-readable
form by the authors of this article.
59. These common crimes are colloquially referred to as "street crimes," and include auto theft, bank
robbery, narcotics offenses, and interstate transport of stolen goods. For this Article, "common crime" is
used interchangeably with "non-white-collar crime."
60. This shift in the focus of prosecutorial attention peaked in 1975, the year after Watergate, when
10% of the sentenced population consisted of college-educated persons convicted of white-collar crimes
(as compared to 2.8% in 1963) and 63.7% consisted of non-college-educated persons convicted of com-
mon crimes (as compared to 83.3% in 1963). It is important to note here that the actual number (N = 132)
of college-educated persons convicted of white-collar crimes in 1975 is still not overwhelming. This may
be, however, not because of the lack of interest in the prosecution of white-collar offenders, but rather
because the litigation involved in white-collar cases frequently is quite complicated. See, e.g., Katz,
Legality and Equality: Plea Bargaining in the Prosecution of White-Collar Crimes, 13 LAW AND SOC'Y
REV. 431 (1979). Consequently, the allocation of resources required to pursue even this number of cases is
likely to be substantial. See Richard, supra note 52. Thus the more than tripling of the proportionate
number of convictions of these cases from 1963 to 1975 in this District is likely a much more dramatic dif-
ference than it otherwise might seem.
61. A former United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York stated:
In 1972, speaking for the United States Attorney's Office in the Southern District of New
York, I served notice on the business community that we would no longer wait hat-in-hand
for businessmen to voluntarily bring forward information about possible crimes. We would
rely instead on our own investigations and our own prosecutions, as we have in the past,
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know that they have been harmed, white-collar crime cannot often be persistently
pursued through a reactive response to complaints, 62 thus the need for an affir-
mative prosecutorial plan. The question is, however, what effect this kind of proac-
tive prosecution of white-collar crime has upon sentencing.
A. METHODS AND MEASUREMENT
The data collected for this study are analyzed by using multiple regression pro-
cedures. 63 As a statistical method, multiple regression analysis is attractive because
it facilitates precise and quantitative estimates of the effects of different factors on a
dependent variable. 64 Despite some drawbacks, 65 multiple regression techniques
have become a standard part of social scientific research concerning sentencing. 66
In multiple regression, one first identifies the major independent variables (e.g., a
defendant's sex or level of education) that are believed to influence the dependent
variable (e.g., the severity of the sentence imposed). Relationships between the
dependent variable and the independent variables are then estimated by extracting
from each the effects of other major variables. These "net" relationships are ex-
pressed in the form of regression coefficients. The regression coefficient provides a
mathematical estimate of the degree of influence any independent variable has upon
the dependent variable being analyzed. In other words, the dependent variable is
studied by determining the manner in which it is affected by independent variables.
The results of multiple regression analyses, therefore, show the effects of each in-
dependent variable on the dependent variable, while holding the effects of other in-
dependent variables statistically constant. 67
The independent variables of greatest interest in the regression analyses presented
but with one significant difference. In the past we had tended to accept as made in good
faith, representations by businessmen who claimed to have been the "victims" of
shakedowns by labor racketeers or corrupt public officials. From now on, I said, the
primary evidence of such facts will come from the prompt reporting of such crimes and
willingness to cooperate in bringing violators to justice.
Seymour, supra note 56 at 822. The proactive analysis is described in detail in Nagel & Hagan, supra note
1 at 1447.
62. See Katz, supra note 60; Richard, supra note 52 (arguing prosecutors must devise affirmative
response to white-collar crime). As one Assistant United States Attorney indicated, "We don't sit back
and wait for cases to walk in the door. We go out and make them." Nagel & Hagan, supra note I at 1447.
63. For introductory discussions of regression techniques, see M. EZEKIEL & K. Fox, METHODS OF COR-
RELATION AND REGRESSION ANALYSIS (3d ed. 1967); M. FINKELSTEIN, QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN LAW
(1978); T. WONNACoTr & R. WONNACOTT, ECONOMETRICS (2d ed. 1979). See also Finkelstein, Regression
Models in Administrative Proceedings, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1442 (1970); Fisher, Multiple Regressions in
Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 702 (1980).
64. See supra note 5 (citing articles utilizing multiple regression; description of analysis).
65. In using multiple regression analysis for the study of sentencing decisions, one liability is that
multiple regression is designed for use with dependent variables measured at the interval level. It is dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to examine the use of qualitatively different kinds of sanctions, alone and in
combination, with multiple regression techniques. See supra note 5.
66. See Hagan & Bumiller, Making Sense of Sentencing: A Review and Critique of Sentencing
Research, in RESEARCH ON SENTENCING (A. Blumstein ed. 1982).
67. Statistical tests allow one to draw conclusions, within standardized ranges of confidences, about
the probability that any effect of an independent variable has occurred as a result of mere chance.
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are the offender/offense combinations. The method used to incorporate these com-
binations in the analyses is "dummy coding."68 Three separate "dummy variables"
are created to represent three of the four categories created earlier in the
cross-classification of the offender's education and offense. It is important to make
clear that the omission of one of the categories does not result in the loss of informa-
tion. In fact, the omitted category, non-college-educated persons sentenced for
common crimes, becomes a reference point for considering the effects of the remain-
ing offender/offense combinations. Each of the dummy variables, when included in
the regressions that follow, yields a regression coefficient that represents the dif-
ference in sentence outcome for cases classified in the specified offender/offense
groupings compared to non-college-educated persons sentenced for the common
crime grouping. Using this method, this study can address issues central to
white-collar sentencing. For example, it can be determined whether there is a
disparity in the sentences received by college-educated persons for white-collar
crimes as compared to non-college-educated persons for common crimes, holding
constant all other independent variables in the regression analysis.
The remaining independent variables included in the regression analysis are the
offender's prior conviction record, 69 the statutory seriousness of the offense, 7° the
offender's plea,I1 the presence or absence of a presentence report,7" and the of-
fender's race7 ' and sex.74
The dependent variable, the severity of the sentence, is measured in two separate
ways. The purpose of measuring sentence severity in two ways is to examine whether
the way in which the sentencing outcome is coded will affect the result." Studying
only the 9,303 offenders whose sentences included a prison term, the first regression
analysis uses, as the dependent variable, the actual number of months the persons
were sentenced to prison. The second regression analysis considers all 18,289 per-
sons receiving any sentence. In this analysis, persons whose sentence included no
term of imprisonment are given a score of zero on the months of imprisonment
scale. Table 6 provides a listing of nonimprisonment sanctions. The variables and
values for the regression analysis are summarized in Table 2.
B. THE REGRESSION RESULTS
The results of the first part of these analyses are presented in Table 3. This table
reports the results of regressing both of the two dependent measures of sentence out-
come on the independent variables. The primary interest in these two regression
analyses is to determine whether college-educated persons are sentenced more le-
niently for their white-collar crimes than are non-college-educated persons sen-
68. For a discussion of dummy coding, see F. KERLINGER & E. PEDHAZER, MULTIPLE REGRESSION IN
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH (1973).
69. Lack of prior convictions is coded as "0"; one or more prior convictions is coded as "-l."
70. The statutory seriousness of the offense is measured on an eleven point continuous scale that cor-
responds to the maximum length of prison sentence allowed for the specified offense by the U.S. Code.
71. Guilty pleas are coded as "0"; not guilty pleas are coded as "1."
72. The presence of a presentence report is coded as "0"; the absence of areport is coded as "1."
73. Caucasians (white) are coded as "0"; noncaucasians are coded as "1."
74. Females are coded as "0"; males are coded as "1 ."
75. See supra note 5 (discussing the impact of coding upon results).
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tenced for common crimes, when other independent variables are held constant. The
answer is affirmative, regardless of the dependent measure used.
In the first analysis considering only the 9,303 offenders sentenced to prison, col-
lege-educated persons received sentences that averaged more than a year shorter
than those received by non-college-educated persons convicted of common
crimes.7 6 In the second analysis considering the sentences of all offenders, the
magnitude and relative order (according to size) of the above effects was altered,
although the analysis continued to indicate leniency for college-educated persons
convicted of white-collar offenses as compared to persons lacking college education
who were convicted of non-white-collar offenses. College-educated persons con-
victed of white-collar crimes received sentences more than five months shorter than
non-college-educated persons convicted of common crimes. 77  Non-
college-educated persons convicted of white-collar crimes and college-educated
persons convicted of common crimes received sentences more than four7 I and six79
months shorter respectively than non-college-educated persons convicted of com-
mon crimes. The probability of these sentence disparities having occurred by chance
is less than one in a thousand. 0
In addition, other independent variables influenced sentencing outcomes. The
results of the two regression analyses presented in Table 3 reveal that the number of
convictions, the statutory seriousness of the offense, and the plea tendered had con-
sistently strong effects on sentencing outcomes, irrespective of how the sentencing
outcome was measured. For example, those offenders who pleaded not guilty re-
ceived sentences averaging twenty-five months longer than those who pleaded
guilty.8 ' Men received sentences averaging eight to nine months longer than
women.8 2 Overall, race had a very small impact upon sentencing, and was opposite
to the anticipated result. Nonwhites on the average received sentences one month
shorter than whites.
The regression results presented in Table 3 provide support for the common
perception that white-collar criminals are treated with leniency. The first group
study, consisting of 9,303 offenders, suggested that irrespective of education at-
tained, the person convicted of a white-collar crime received a shorter period of im-
prisonment than did non-college-educated persons convicted of common crimes.
76. With all independent variables in the regression held constant, the understandardized regression
coefficient (b) is -12.06. In lay terms, this means college-educated persons convicted of white-collar of-
fenses receive sentences slightly above 12 months shorter than the reference category, non-
college-educated persons convicted of common crimes. The F-value for this coefficient provides a
measure of statistical significance or an estimate of the probability of this finding having occurred by
chance alone. The F-value of 18.50 indicates that the probability of this finding having occurred by mere
chance is less than one in a thousand. It is interesting to note that non-college-educated persons convicted
of white-collar crimes (b = -5.23) and college-educated persons convicted of common crimes (b =
-10.31) also received shorter sentences than non-college-educated persons convicted of common crimes.
The former receive sentences on the average of slightly more than five months shorter and the latter,
slightly more than 10 months shorter.
77. b = -5.33. The b of -5.33 means a sentence average slightly more than five months shorter.
78. b = -4.20.
79. b = -6.31.
80. F = 12.36, 11.50, and 36.52.
81. b = 25.02 and 25.88.
82. b = 8.81 and 9.60.
[Vol.20:259
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME, WHITE-COLLAR TIME
Moreover, college-educated persons convicted of common crimes also received
shorter periods of imprisonment than did their non-college-educated counterparts.
In the second group study, consisting of 18,289 offenders, the above results were
duplicated. In both group studies, college-educated offenders received preferred
treatment. One difference between the two analyses, however, was that in the
former, college-educated white-collar offenders were the most favored group,
whereas, in the latter, college-educated common crime offenders were treated most
leniently.
Far from surprising, this difference underscores the Article's earlier assertion that
the various statistical techniques used to evaluate sentencing disparities may yield
slightly different results.8 3 This single difference notwithstanding, the overall pat-
tern is clear: in the Southern District of New York between 1963 and 1976,
white-collar criminals received less severe sentences than did non-white-collar
criminals.
The pattern raises two important issues which are addressed in the balance of this
Article. First, what specific sentences were imposed on white-collar offenders as
compared to sentences imposed on common criminals? Second, were there dif-
ferences in the sentences imposed for the several white-collar offenses?
C. THE TABULAR RESULTS
Table 4 presents a cross-classification of the four offender/offense combinations
with the type of sentence imposed. The most striking feature of this table is the
variety of ways in which sanctions are combined within the different offender/of-
fense combinations. For example, while 41.4 percent of the non-college-educated
offenders convicted of common crimes received sentences of straight prison time,
only 17.6 percent of the college-educated offenders convicted of white-collar crime
received this kind of sentence.8 4 In contrast, when the white-collar groupings did
receive sentences that included prison, it was often in combination with a fine or
probation. Thus while only 17.6 percent of the college-educated persons convicted
of white-collar crime received straight prison time, 18.3 percent of them received a
prison term plus a fine and 20.6 percent received a prison term plus probation. 5
Comparing the above findings with the earlier regression results suggests that
judges added probation or fines to sentences in an attempt to compensate for the
shorter prison terms given white-collar offenders. This seems consistent with Mann,
Wheeler, and Sarat's observation that judges combine sentencing options when
sentencing white-collar offenders in an attempt to satisfy their concerns about both
the individual offender and general deterrence.8 6 Significantly, judges rarely used
fines alone in their sentencing of white-collar or common criminals. 7 Rather, fines
were more frequently imposed along with prison and probation sentences. The data
83. See supra note 5.
84. Straight prison sentences for the other two groups include: non-college-educated, white-collar
crime: 19.4%; college-educated, common crime: 24.5%. See Table 4.
85. Only 3.4 percent of non-college-educated persons convicted of common crimes received prison
sentences coupled with a fine. Only 8.9 percent of persons in this category received prison terms with
subsequent terms of probation.
86. Mann, Wheeler & Sarat, supra note 1, at 486.
87. This finding is consistent with the Mann, Wheeler, & Sarat study, id. at 496.
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indicate that fines are given to twice as many persons convicted of white-collar
crimes as to persons convicted of common crimes.
Table 5 illustrates the effects of a procedure sometimes used in the Southern
District of New York to reduce the length of a prison term imposed. By using the
procedure, the court would sentence a defendant to a period of imprisonment and
subsequently reduce the length of incarceration while imposing a term of probation.
This procedure was used more frequently with white-collar offenders than with
other types of offenders, probably as a way to compromise concerns about the in-
dividual offender and general deterrence. According to Table 5, while 4.5 percent of
the non-college-educated persons convicted of common crimes received reduced
prison sentences, 11.5 percent of the college-educated persons convicted of
white-collar crimes received this reduction. This difference may not be dramatic,
but it contributes to a larger difference between these groups in the proportion
receiving full prison terms: while 49.2 percent of the non-college-educated common
crime group received a full prison term, only 38.8 percent of the college-educated
white-collar crime group received a full prison term. The remaining white-collar
group also benefits from this procedure."8 This analysis confirms that white-collar
offenders benefit from the specific types and combinations of sanctions that are im-
posed on them. 9 This benefit is not fully apparent in the relatively undifferentiated
regression results reported earlier.
D. SPECIFIC WHITE-COLLAR OFFENSES
The sentencing data compiled from the Southern District of New York between
1963 and 1976 are listed in Table 6. Thirteen white-collar offenses and a residual
category labeled common crimes are cross-classified with the sentences imposed.
The table primarily demonstrates the considerable variation among sentences for
violations of specific crimes. Some white-collar crimes were enforced with notably
lenient sanctions while other white-collar crimes involved sentences equal to or
harsher than sentences imposed for common crimes.
1. Trade Restraint as Compared to Mail Fraud and Securities Violations
A comparison of the punishment meted out for trade restraint offenses with that
imposed for mail fraud and for securities violations vividly evinces extreme sen-
tencing disparity between different white-collar crimes. One way to examine relative
sentencing severity is to contrast the frequency with which prison time is imposed for
competing offenses. Similarly, sentencing leniency may be reflected in the frequency
with which the punishment for an offense is limited to the assessment of a fine. A
second means of comparing treatment of offenders is to contrast the types of pleas
entered for various crimes, as is done in this study between trade restraint and
securities violations. A high incidence of guilty pleas for a given offense indicates
severe treatment practices; a high incidence of nolo contendere pleas indicates
lenient treatment. 90
88. Only 35.4 percent of the non-college-educated white-collar crime group received full prison terms.
89. See Table 5.
90.This study adopts a common presumption that a nolo plea is the preferred outcome. But see In re
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Among white-collar offenses examined in this study, the greatest incidence of
sentencing variability occurred between mail fraud and illegal restraints of trade. Of
the 93 persons convicted of illegal restraint of trade in the Southern District of New
York between 1963 and 1976, only 2.4076 received a sentence that included imprison-
ment.9 Conversely, over 60076 of the 483 mail fraud offenders convicted in that
district during that time period were sentenced to serve time in prison.9 2 Consistent
with these data, 74.207o of individuals sentenced for trade restraint offenses drew
punishment limited to the assessment of a fine, 93 while only 3.1 % of those convicted
of mail fraud received such a sentence. The strict prosecution of mail fraud quite
possibly arises at least in part from the fact that the mail fraud statute94 has been
used to combat general corruption," a practice that has engendered much scholarly
Ocean Shipping Antitrust Litigation, 500 F. Supp. 1235, 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (large fines assessed
defendants pleading nolo contendere to price fixing charges in District of Columbia).
91. See Table 6. The pertinent antitrust statute is 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1976).
92. See, e.g., Griffin v. Carey, No. 81 Civ. 5941-ADS, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 1982) (sentenced
primarily to probation for mail fraud conviction, defendant required to serve three month prison term as
special condition of probation); United States v. Johnson, No. 78 Cr. 772-CSH, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
24, 1979) (convicted of mail fraud and conspiracy, defendant's sentence consisted of one month in prison
and 35 on probation); United States v. Grant, 433 F. Supp. 1113, 1114 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (convicted of
mail fraud, defendant sentenced to three years imprisonment and three years' probation); see also United
States v. Mahler, 578 F. 2d 730 (2d Cir. 1978), citing, United States v. McCord, No. Cr. 3-76-132
(N.D.Tex. 1976) (sentences of 10-50 years for various defendants in major mail fraud prosecution).
93. See, e.g., United States v. Burlington Industries, 1965 TRADE CAS. 71,376 at 80,614 (imposition of
fines ranging from $2,500 to $12,500 to individual defendants convicted of price fixing); accord In re
Ocean Shipping Antitrust Litigation, 500 F. Supp. at 1238 (large fines assessed defendants who pleaded
nolo contendere to price fixing charges in District of Columbia indictment).
94. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976). The statute provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme... to defraud,. .. for the pur-
pose of executing such scheme... places in any post office or authorized depository for
mail, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or
receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by
mail... any such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976).
95. Thomas Henderson and Professor Coffee in particular have noted the creative fashion in which the
mail fraud statute has been used for this purpose. See Henderson, The Expanding Role of Federal Pro-
secutors in Combating State and Local Political Corruption, 8 CuM. L. REV. 385, 393; Coffee, From Tort
to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminalization of Fiduciary Breaches and the Problematic Line Be-
tween Law and Ethics, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 117, 129 (1981); see, e.g., United States v. Barber, 668 F.2d
778 (4th Cir. 1982) (conviction upheld where Alcohol Beverage Control Commissioner mailed falsified
forms defrauding government and private businesses); United States v. Pintar, 630 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir.
1980) (upholding conviction of regional commissioner who mailed request for funds to pay secretary not
working for agency); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1976) (affirming conviction of
building commissioner for accepting kickbacks by mail).
A recent discussion of the prosecution of white-collar crime notes: "Broad language, coupled with the
lack of legislative history explaining their intended meanings, has given courts considerable latitude in
determining the scope of 'scheme to defraud.' " White-Collar Crime: Second Annual Survey of Law, 19
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 173, 287 (1981). The survey notes that "activities [recently] found within the mail and
wire fraud statutes include... falsification of voter registration affidavits to obtain absentee ballots for
nonexistent voters [and] bribery and kickback schemes involving public officials." Id. at 288. Other
crimes found within the statute involved "fraudulent use of computers, sales of worthless distributor-
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criticism. 96 The harsh punishment imposed upon violators of this statute 7 may
result from a judicial perception that the offender has contravened public trust in a
manner similar to the offender in the bribery and public embezzlement contexts. 91
Contrasting the types of pleas entered for various offenses provides a useful
means to examine for divergent sanctioning practices between trade restraint and
securities violations. A considerably greater percentage of securities violators plead
guilty to their charge (57.4%) than did antitrust offenders (41.9%). 99 Even more
significantly, while only .9°o of those prosecuted for securities violations plead nolo
contendere, 58.1% did so in trade restraint cases.' 00 Notably, the incidence of nolo
ships,... attorney and physician conspiracies to inflate medical expenses of accident victims, fraudulent
loan authorizations, deprivation of the honest and faithful services of employees, imaginative predatory
schemes, and recently, energy frauds." Id. Among the better known officials convicted under the federal
mail fraud statute are former Illinois Governor Otto Kerner, United States v. lsaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1149
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974) and former Maryland Governor Marvin Mandel, United
States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, affd on reh'g, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 961 (1980). Other political officials convicted of mail fraud are former Governor Ray Blanton from
Tennessee, N.Y. Times, June 10, 1981, at § A19; Congressman Charles Diggs, Jr. from Michigan, United
States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d 988 (D.C. Cir. 1979); and Earl Bush, press secretary to Mayor Richard Daley of
Chicago, United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 977 (1976).
96. See Morano, The Mail-Fraud Statute: A Procrustean Bed, 14 J. MAR. L. REV. 45 (1980) (propos-
ing limitations to the reach of the mail fraud statute); Coffee, supra note 95 at 126; Comment, Federal
Prosecution of Elected State Officials for Mail Fraud: Creative Prosecution or an Affront to
Federalism?, 28 AM. U.L. REV. 63 (1978) (critical analysis of increase in federal involvement in state and
local political corruption through mail fraud).
97. See, e.g., Walker v. United States, No. 81 Civ. 5282, No. 80 Cr. 327, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. July 13,
1982) (defendant sentenced to concurrent terms of 4 years imprisonment and fined $10,000 for violations
of mail fraud and federal immigration laws as well as health and welfare statutes); United States v. Con-
nett, No. 78 Cr. 775, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. July I, 1980) (convicted of mail fraud and fraud (odometer
rollback), defendant sentenced to 4 month prison term and fined $5,000); United States v. Corr, 434 F.
Supp. 408, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (convicted of conspiracy to violate mail fraud and security laws, sale of
unregistered securities, perjury, and false statements, defendant sentenced to concurrent terms of thirty
months imprisonment and fined $10,000); Ostrer v. United States, 77 Civ. 1805, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
12, 1977) (defendant sentenced to three years imprisonment and $55,000 fine for conviction of eleven
counts of stock fraud, mail fraud and conspiracy); see also United States v. Mahler, 579 F.2d 730 (2d Cir.
1978) citing United States v. Lofland, No. 75 Cr. 769, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (fifteen year sentence plus
fine imposed for mail fraud), affd Inen., 535 F.2d 1244 (2d Cir. 1976).
98. In United States v. Craig, 573 F.2d 455 (1977), for example, six elected officials were convicted of
mail fraud as a result of their involvement in a complex bribery scheme. In an interview with the Assistant
United States Attorney largely responsible for the prosecution of this case, the authors learned that the
mail fraud statute was used because it provided the greatest flexibility in terms of evidentiary matters. We
were also told that the mail fraud statute is often used in the Northern District of Illinois, as in the
Southern District of New York, to prosecute corruption cases.
99. See, e.g., United States v. Mahler, 579 F.2d 730, 738 (2d Cir.) (eight year sentence for issuing false
proxy statements not excessive), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 991, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 1104 (1978); United
States v. Rubinson, 426 F. Supp. 266, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (reduced "excessive" three year sentence for
violation of securities laws to two years imprisonment); accord United States v. Smallwood, 443 F.2d
535, 543 (8th Cir.) (35 year sentence for securities fraud was not abuse of district court's discretion), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 853 (1971); cf. United States v. MacClain, 501 F.2d 1006, 1013 (10th Cir. 1974) (four
and one-half year prison sentence for conviction on five counts of securities fraud not cruel and unusual
punishment).
100. In United States v. Burlington Industries, defendants who pleaded nolo contendere to charges of
conspiracy to fix prices in the glass fiber industry received only fines from the Southern District court.
1965 TRADE CAS. 71,376 at 80,614. See supra note 93. Where district courts have imposed prison terms,
the sentences are often affirmed on appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Prince, 533 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir.
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pleas for securities violations is charactistic of the frequency with which that plea is
used in most white-collar cases. 01
The disparity in sentences may be due primarily to the substantive elements of the
specific crimes. Both securities violations and mail fraud involve fraud, a concept
deeply rooted in our common law tradition. Restraint violations, however, are
statutory offenses that lack a similar historical foundation. Alternatively, the
economic nature of antitrust offenses may lead judges to see the culpability of the
substantive crime as somehow different in kind from that of the more tangible
fraud-based offenses. 02 In any case, the classification of trade restraint as a
criminal offense is a societal decision to define the boundaries of competitive
business practices. Consequently, this may explain why the judicial response to
securities fraud was more severe than it was to trade restraint violations.
In response to this trend, Congress passed the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties
Act of 1974.103 One purpose of the Act was to provide more severe sanctions for an-
titrust violations.' 0 4 The maximum fine for an individual was increased from
$50,000 to $100,000; the Act also established a possible $1,000,000 fine for cor-
porate defendants.' 05 Despite these increased penalties, the data used in this Article
covered only the two years following enactment of the law; consequently, the effect
of the Act upon sentencing patterns in the antitrust area is inconclusive.
It is indeed possible that the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974 has
had the effect of enhancing the severity of sentencing treatment for criminal anti-
trust violations.' 0 6 It is the authors' hypothesis, however, that any such change
1976) (in affirming denial of defendant's motion to withdraw nolo plea in price fixing case, court held
that two month prison sentenct accompanied by one year probation and $40,000 fine not cruel and
unusual punishment).
Table 7 indicates that nolo pleas were allowed in well over half (58.1 %) the trade restraint cases. IRS
frauds were the next most likely type of case to produce this plea, with only 2.3 percent of these cases
resulting in nolo pleas. Table 8 makes clear that this plea is closely associated with lenient sentencing, as
more than half of all the nolo pleas in our data result in fines (55.2%), and nearly a third in fines com-
bined with probation (31.0%).
101. See Table 7 (indicating frequency of use of nolo contendere plea in white-collar crimes surveyed
in this Article).
102. This explanation would be consistent with the particularly high incidence of sentences including
fines in this area: it seems reasonable to infer that judges viewing an offense as purely economic would
tend to fashion economic punishment, reserving tangible punishment, i.e., prison or probation, for more
tangible wrongdoing, e.g., fraud.
103. 15 U.S.C. § 3 (1976).
104. Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976)).
105. 15 U.S.C. § 3(1) (1974).
106. See Kirkpatrick, Antitrust Enforcement in the Seventies, 30 CATH. U.L. REv. 431 (1981).
Kirkpatrick notes that beginning nationally in 1972 there was an upswing in prosecutions of antitrust
cases and that enhancing potential penalties in 1974 had its intended effect:
The trial judges appreciated the increased concern about antitrust offenses reflected in this
congressional action, and the sentences imposed for Sherman violations went up according-
ly.
After the violations became felonies, the sentences imposed generally increased, prob-
ably averaging three months. In about ten cases filed after 1975, the judge imposed one to
three months imprisonment on some defendants after nolo contendre pleas had been
entered. In almost all cases, the court has imposed terms of probation, often accompanied
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would be an ephemeral one, existing more in relative than absolute terms. It seems
highly improbable that the extreme leniency of sentencing in the antitrust context
can be cured by merely statutory means.' 07
2. Bribery and Public Embezzlement
As officers or representatives of the people, public officials maintain fiduciary
relationships with the public. 08 Judges are particularly sensitive to violations of this
public trust' 09 and presumably punish violators severely-especially when compared
to punishments meted out for other forms of white-collar crime. Indeed, the two of-
fenses most closely associated with public corruption, bribery of a public official I1 0
and embezzlement of public funds, property, or records,"' have been most fre-
quently used for the prosecution of public corruption.' 12 These offenses have the
longest terms of imprisonment statutorily prescribed for any of the white-collar
crimes considered in this Article.' 'I Presumably, sentences for violations of the
bribery and public embezzlement statutes would be correspondingly more severe.
The data in Table 6, however, refute this hypothesis. The table indicates that 12%
by a substantial term of imprisonment suspended in whole or at least in major part.
Id. at 474-76; see also United States v. Alton Box Board Co., 1977-1 TRADE CAS. 161,336 at 71,166
(prison sentences in price fixing cases may be justified when crime performed in manner offensive to
historical morality of society); United States v. Clark Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 1973 TRADE CAS.
174,482 at 94,141 (imposition of prison sentences justified by seriousness of antitrust offenses committed
by defendants).
107. To the extent that the especially lenient sentences imposed upon antitrust violators result from
judges' preconceptions of the inherent culpability of offenses, see supra note 102 and accompanying text,
the simple alteration of the punishment statutorily prescribed for those offenses probably would not
significantly change the jurists' predisposition to impose lighter punishment.
108. See United States v. Mandel, 59t F.2d 1347, 1363 (court viewed governor as trustee for state and
state's citizens; he therefore owed fiduciary duties of honesty and loyalty), afJd on reh'g, 602 F.2d 653
(4th Cir. 1979) (en banc). But cf. United States v. Margiotta, 662 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1981) (indicted for
alleged scheme to defraud, Nassau County Republican Party Chairman, a nongovernmental, appointed
official, escaped punishment when jury failed to return verdict).
109. In interviews with the authors, judges emphasized the particular seriousness they attached to
crimes by government officials. When asked if embezzlers of private funds received more lenient treat-
ment at sentencing than embezzlers of public funds, the judges interviewed by the authors invariably
responded in the affirmative. See Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cir.) ("No trustee has
more sacred duties than a public official...."), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941).
110. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1976) (the offense includes the payment to, acceptance of, or demand for a bribe
by a public official). See, e.g., United States v. Dozier, 672 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1982) (Louisiana Commis-
sioner of Agriculture prosecuted under state bribery statute, RICO, and the Hobbs Act).
111. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1976).
112. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 625 F.2d 158 (9th Cir.) (upholding conviction of payee's
friend who attempted to cash stolen Illinois Public Aid warrant), cert. denied, 449 U. S. 984; United
States v. Smith, 596 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1979) (affirmed conviction of college employee for drawing and
cashing college work study funds for ficticious students); United States v. Maxwell, 588 F.2d 568 (7th
Cir.) (upheld conviction of college official for making and negotiating false checks drawn upon financial
aid monies belonging to United States government), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 877 (1978).
113. The bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(e) (1976), carries a term of imprisonment of up to fifteen
years, while public embezzlement, 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1976),carries a 10 year term. Almost all of the other
white-collar offenses considered in this Article have statutorily prescribed maximum prison terms of five
years or less.
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of defendants convicted of bribery received only fines.' 4 This relatively high
percentage of lenient sentences ranks second only to the restraint of trade violation
cases." 5 In contrast, not a single defendant convicted of public embezzlement
received such a limited sentence." 6 An examination of the harshest sentences in-
dicates that 43.2% of persons convicted of bribery were sentenced to some term of
imprisonment, while 42.5% of persons convicted of public embezzlement received
such sentences. This is noteworthy because these percentages are lower than the
52.10o of persons sentenced to some term of imprisonment for common crimes and
also were lower than seven of the other white-collar offenses.
At least two inferences can be drawn from these findings. First, there is an im-
perfect correlation between the severity of the offense, as reflected in the statutorily
prescribed maximum prison term, and the pattern of actual sentences. Second,
despite the presumption that persons in positions of fiduciary trust should be held to
the highest standard, with the possible exception of those public officials who were
convicted of mail fraud,' ' violators of the public trust sentenced in the Southern
District of New York between the years 1963 and 1976 were not punished according-
ly.
3. Bank Embezzlement
The breach of a fiduciary responsibility is also present in another statutory of-
fense: the theft, embezzlement, or misapplication of funds by a bank officer or
employee."I I While these offenders were not elected to their positions of trust, there
was an expectation that as officers of a financial institution they would uphold the
law. An examination of Tables 6 and 9 reveals that relatively few-only 20.707o -of
those convicted of bank embezzlement received prison sentences.1 9 Interestingly,
this lack of severity did not translate into marked leniency, as it did in the antitrust
area. Only .2% of the cases drew sentences limited to assessment of a fine. 12 0 The
large majority of bank embezzlers were sentenced to some term of probation, with
or without the additional sentence of a fine. 2 '
114. At the other extreme, 16.20o7 of bribery offenders received sentences including both a fine and im-
prisonment whereas only .207o of antitrust violators received such punishment. See United States v. Bern-
stein, 553 F.2d 775, 780 (2d Cir.) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting) (arguing that sentence should be
limited to imposition of fine), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 998 (1976). Compare United States v. Bernstein, 533
F.2d at 775 (defendant convicted of bribery in obtaining FHA loan guarantee sentenced to five years im-
prisonment and $10,000 fine on each bribery count) with United States v. National Dairy Products Corp.,
(1964) TRADE CAS. (CCH) 71,163, at 79,608 (three month sentence on each count of criminal antitrust
conviction; sentence suspended).
115. In the restraint of trade cases, 74.2% only received fines.
116. Table 6 indicates that no defendants convicted of public embezzlement received a sentence limited
to imposition of a fine.
117 See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
118. 18 U.S.C. § 656 (1976).
119. Of convicted bank embezzlement offenders, 73.407o received a sentence free of prison time. See
Table 6. But see, e.g., Duke v. United States, 396 F. Supp. 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) citing United States v.
Duke, 469 F.2d 1404 (2d Cir. 1972) (affirming without opinion imposition of five year prison sentence for
bank embezzlement).
120. See Table 6.
121. See Tables 6 and 9.
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4. Fraud or False Statements
Data on sentences for offenses involving fraud or false statements against the
government, 122 or against a banking or lending institution,'2 3 were predictable with
the exception of the distinctive pattern for sentences for fraud or false statements on
a bank entry, by officers of the bank or by others involved in the course of transac-
ting bank business. While between 43.2% and 63.4% of violators of the other
white-collar crimes 24 received some term of imprisonment, only 26.37o of persons
convicted of fraud or false statements on a bank entry received a prison term.
125
Conversely, while offenders of the other white-collar crimes received sentences
limited to fines in 1.6 to 8.7% of the cases, there were no cases in which a person
convicted of fraud or false statements on a bank entry was only sentenced to pay a
fine. These results are similar to the pattern discussed above for persons convicted of
bank embezzlement. 26 If a substantial number of offenders of the fraud and false
statements on a bank entry are bank officers, then the similar sentencing pattern for
the two offenses is predictable. The scarcity of cases in this category, 27 however,
precludes such conclusory findings.
III. Conclusion
The purpose of this Article was to examine the types of sentences received by
white-collar offenders as compared to other types of offenders in the Southern
District of New York.' 28 Although the evidence presented generally confirms the
view that white-collar offenders benefit from relatively lenient treatment, 29 it has
also shown that this conclusion depends upon the kind of white-collar crime con-
sidered.
This Article considered data drawn from the Southern District of New York,
reputed to be among the most active in the country in the pursuit of white-collar
crime.' 30 Inspection of the data for the years 1963 through 1976 provided evidence
that during this period there was a significant shift toward the increased prosecution
of white-collar cases. In the initial phase of data analysis, white-collar crime was
treated as an aggregated category differentiated only by whether the offenders in-
volved had received a college education.' 3 ' Using multiple regression techniques and
considering only those offenders who received prison sentences, the initial analysis
122. 18 U.S.C. §§ 281, 1001 (1976); 26 I.R.C. §§ 7201, 7203, 7206 (1976).
123. 18 U.S.C. 99 1005, 1014 (1976).
124. See Table 6 for the other white-collar crimes considered and the types of sentences doled out for
each (sum total of "prison," "fine & prison" and "prison & probation" sentences for a given crime yields
percentage of persons receiving some term of imprisonment for that crime).
125. See Table 6.
126. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
127. This category consisted of only 38 cases.
128. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (elaborating upon the general aims of this Article).
129. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text (regression results demonstrating generally more le-
nient sentences for white-collar offenders).
130. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (appropriateness of examining cases decided in the
Southern District of New York).
131. See supra text accompanying note 25 (discussing formation of categories of analysis).
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indicated that college-educated persons convicted of white-collar crimes received
sentences that on the average were more than a year shorter than those received by
non-college-educated persons convicted of common crimes. This finding holds true
when additional variables remain constant. When all convicted offenders were con-
sidered (regardless of whether their sentence included a term of imprisonment), the
magnitude of the difference between college-educated persons convicted of
white-collar offenses and non-college-educated persons convicted of common
crimes was less-only five months-but the former were still the recipients of the
preferred sentence. Also, the regression results revealed little about the way sanc-
tions were used alone and in combination to deal with white-collar offenders.' 3 2
A number of interesting patterns became apparent when tabular techniques were
applied. Straight prison time or fines were rarely used exclusively to sanction
white-collar offenders.' 33 Instead, judges seemed to compensate for short prison
sentences by combining them with fines or probation.'3 4 In addition, white-collar
offenders benefitted uniquely from reductions in prison terms.
Finally, this Article expressed a concern about the information lost in trying to
treat white-collar crimes as a homogeneous group. As Cullen, Link, and Polanzi
note: "It is a frequent practice to refer to white-collar crime as though it were a
unitary phenomenon. However, the violations that have traditionally been grouped
under this offense category often have little in common with one another.... , In
response to this problem, this Article looked individually at sentences imposed for
different kinds of white-collar crimes.' 36
When specific kinds of white-collar crimes were examined, considerable varia-
tion in their treatment became apparent. For example, defendants convicted of such
crimes as mail fraud, fraudulent claims against government agencies, and tax fraud
were sentenced with a severity that was similar to common crimes, while many (if
not most) other white-collar criminals, particularly those convicted of price-fixing,
received more lenient treatment. One crucial distinction that may account for this
difference involved the public versus private nature of the offense. Mail fraud and
public embezzlement statutes have both been used to pursue proactively the prosecu-
tion of government corruption, and judges interviewed by the authors emphasized
the significance they attached to violations of the public trust. One clear indication
of this distinction was the difference in the sentencing of public and private
embezzlers.
Probably the most important point to be recognized from this study is the need
for caution in reaching general conclusions concerning the sentencing of
white-collar offenders as a group. Although the cases indicated leniency in sentenc-
ing decisions, there was considerable variation among different kinds of
white-collar offenses. In addition, judges sought compromises between different
132. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text (regression results).
133. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (only 17.6% of college-educated persons convicted of
white-collar crime received sentences of straight prison time).
134. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (38.9% of college-educated persons received combina-
tion sentences).
135. Cullen, Link & Polanzi, The Seriousness of Crime Revisited: Have Attitudes Toward White Col-
lar Crime Changed?, 20 CRIMINOLOGY 83, 96 (1982).
136. See supra notes 89-127 and accompanying text (concerning sentencing for specific types of
white-collar offenses).
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goals of sentencing through the combination of different kinds of sanctions.' 37
Together, these findings suggest that future research on the sentencing of
white-collar offenders should be attentive to the specific kinds of crimes committed
by these offenders, and to the specific kinds and combinations of sanctions imposed
upon them.
137. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text (uses of alternative sentences for white-collar of-
fenders).
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